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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law, as epitomized by the statutes and common law of the State 
of Delaware, has painted itself into a corner. Shareholders are too often 
unprotected—whether it be by statute or through the well-known and articulated 
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, or good faith. This Article argues that the least-
theorized and utilized fiduciary duty—disclosure or candor—represents the last 
frontier for corporate law, assuming it retains even a small hope of providing 
protection for shareholders. My thesis is counter-intuitive; after all, how can a 
topic that barely merits a footnote in most discussions of corporate law represent 
a “new frontier” for Delaware? 
The argument proceeds in three principal sections. Part I discusses how 
few protections shareholders actually enjoy in the corporate law canon. The 
Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL), the state’s corporate code, is often 
labeled as an “enabling statute.” Rather than providing for mandatory regulatory 
protections, the statute outlines a series of default protections around which 
corporate insiders and shareholders can, at least in principle, contract around. 
For their part, the well-theorized fiduciary duties, in all of their rhetorical allure, 
too often actually do very little work. The duty of care—watered down to a gross 
negligence standard by the business judgment rule, and further eroded by 
statutory exculpation clauses permitted under DGCL section 102(b)(7)—is 
notoriously weak. The duty of loyalty, while correctly characterized as more 
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robust, provides a way out for defendants who are smart enough to enlist 
sophisticated lawyers who understand clever procedural maneuvers under the 
rubric of “disinterested” approval. For its part, after the famous Disney case, the 
duty of good faith provides no protection unless the defendant has demonstrated 
a “conscious disregard” or “intentional dereliction” of duty—a standard that is 
unbearably difficult for a plaintiff to meet. 
Part II tells the story of the most under-theorized and under-utilized 
fiduciary duty: the duty of disclosure, interchangeably called the duty of candor. 
Cases remind us that directors perhaps need to disclose information to 
shareholders, but the duty remains painfully unclear and the case law sparse. 
How much information? When does this duty kick in? I argue that one must 
conceptualize a robust duty of disclosure under state law and use this newly 
enhanced fiduciary duty to protect shareholders—something with which the 
duties of care, good faith, and perhaps even loyalty, have struggled mightily. 
Part II ends by acknowledging the weaknesses of relying on disclosure for 
shareholder protection—not only that it might be counterproductive in 
reinforcing a romantic narrative of shareholder autonomy, but that the duty of 
disclosure is, at least in the eyes of the Delaware judiciary, excruciatingly 
difficult to distinguish from the duties of care and loyalty. 
Part III suggests that notwithstanding these legitimate, and even powerful 
criticisms, the duty of disclosure under state law is worthy of serious 
consideration for a number of reasons. First, it exposes a fundamental weakness 
in corporate theory: shareholders have a fundamental right to participate in 
governance—notably through the vote—but without a duty of disclosure, 
apparently no concomitant right to receive information. This is beyond strange, 
and in fact may explain why two of the seminal cases in the corporate canon—
Smith v. Van Gorkom and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.—may actually be disguised 
duty of disclosure cases. I also contend that the duty of disclosure, or more 
precisely a lack thereof, can help explain several recent developments in 
Delaware corporate law: (1) the often befuddling jurisprudence surrounding 
section 220 “books and records” requests; (2) the on-again, off-again 
reemergence of state insider trading claims (so-called “Brophy” cases); and (3) 
litigation focused on “disclosure-only” settlements and quasi-appraisal 
remedies. Last, but certainly not least, engaging in a conversation about the state 
duty of disclosure forces corporate law to confront a difficult question of 
federalism: perhaps the conventional wisdom is incorrect to assume that federal 
securities regulation, not state corporate law, should remain the locus of 
disclosure obligations. 
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I.  A PLETHORA OF EXISTING WEAK PROTECTIONS 
A. THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
The underlying statutory framework for Delaware corporations is provided 
by the DGCL. It is important to remember that the overarching “rationale behind 
this statutory scheme is that the business of business is better left to those in 
charge of it rather than to judges and legislators.”1 
As such, the statute has few mandatory terms; rather, it sets up a series of 
default provisions around which management and shareholders can theoretically 
contract. As Professor Mark Roe has observed, corporation codes reflect the 
belief that “the corporate law is, or should be, the contract that investors and 
managers want.”2 Or, in the words of Professor Kent Greenfield, “[t]he dominant 
contemporary view of corporate law is contractarian, meaning that corporate 
constituencies are assumed to be best able to determine their mutual rights and 
obligations by way of voluntary arrangement.”3 In the jargon of corporate law, 
state corporate law statutes like the DGCL are “enabling statutes.” As Professor 
Roberta Romano observes, “[s]tate corporate law is in essence enabling, 
following a menu approach that permits firms to alter statutory defaults to fit 
their needs.”4 If one considers this reality from the perspective of political 
economy, this result is altogether unsurprising. After all, “in most states, the only 
well-organized groups that care about corporate law are corporate managers and 
corporate lawyers. The latter group dominates the lawmaking process and the 
state legislature often rubberstamps changes proposed by the corporate bar.”5 As 
legal commentators Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have observed: 
Although formally adopted by the legislature, Delaware’s elected 
representatives have no significant role in crafting Delaware’s statutory corporate 
law. It is the Council of Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar 
 
 1. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457 (2004). 
 2. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2496 (2005) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware’s 
Politics]. Within this mindset, “[c]ontract law seems good, and corporate law, which also seems good, is in many 
dimensions a special form of contract law.” Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 262 
(2002) [hereinafter Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits]. 
 3. Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as 
Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583–84 (2002). 
 4. Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?, 21 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212, 216 (2005); see also William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The 
Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 652 (2006) (“[The legislation] 
added an enabling section liberalizing indemnity of officers and directors found liable for breaches of fiduciary 
duties.”). 
 5. Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99, 118 (2004) 
(footnote omitted); see also William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory 
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1887–88 (1995) (“Delaware delegates to its bar 
association both agenda control and drafting responsibility for any amendments to its corporate code.”); William 
J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 716 (1998) (“At least two interest groups 
benefit from modern corporate laws—local corporate lawyers and managers of firms incorporated within a 
state.”). 
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Association, rather than a legislative committee, that prepares drafts of proposed 
amendments to the General Corporation Law.6 
By contrast, shareholders have far less political sway in crafting legislative 
focus.7 The result is simple: a statute that does not focus on shareholder rights. 
B. TRADITIONAL FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
In the face of a statute that shies from regulation, one could imagine a world 
where fiduciary duties, ex post, pick up the slack. After all, “the Delaware 
legislature and courts cannot promulgate ex ante the standards to govern new 
situations until they see a variety of cases and figure out how well or badly 
people behaved.”8 One might plausibly argue that the “common law simply 
could not live with an unfettered freedom of contract because of the abuses that 
might occur.”9 Yet here, there is a supervening irony. On the one hand, as Robert 
Charles Clark’s well-known corporate law treatise emphasizes, the fiduciary 
principle is “[c]orporate law’s major conceptual contribution.”10 Yet on the other 
hand—as I will argue below—these duties as applied are surprisingly weak, 
notwithstanding superficially impressive rhetoric. 
Consider three duties that are the mainstay of corporate law treatments: the 
duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of good faith. A good starting point 
is the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance, 
which state that corporate fiduciaries must act “[1] in good faith, [2] in a manner 
that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, 
 
 6. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. 
L. REV. 1573, 1599–1600 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
 7. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 
384–85 (2004) (“Shareholders have not yet become effective lobbyists at the state level, while corporate 
management has been for a long time. State legislators respond to a CEO who might threaten to move corporate 
offices outside of the state, but not to a shareholder who threatens to dump her shares.”). 
 8. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1009, 1102 (1997); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1549, 1593 (1989) (“Fiduciary duties provide a set of standards to restrain insiders in exercising their 
discretionary power over the corporation and its shareholders in contingencies not specifically foreseeable and 
thus over which the parties could not contract.”). 
 9. Mark J. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five Years After Professor Cary’s Polemic, 71 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 497, 537 (2000). 
 10. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW xxiii (Francis A. Allen et al. eds., 1986); cf. William T. 
Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in 
Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 861 (2001) (“[W]hat emerged as a counterpoint to the 
evolution of the enabling model of corporation law [statutes] was the second key function of the law of 
corporations: the ex post judicial review of the actions of corporate officers and directors, measured by fiduciary 
principles.”). As one Delaware jurist put it, “[t]he ‘flesh and blood’ of corporate law is judge-made. It is the 
common law formulation of principles of fiduciary duties articulated on a case-by-case basis.” E. Norman 
Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–
2004?: A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2005). 
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and [3] with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be 
expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.”11 
The ALI’s third point, referencing the care of an “ordinarily prudent 
person,” sounds like the perennial “reasonable person” test in negligence-based 
tort claims. But corporate law is not torts, and there is a significant difference: 
the “business judgment rule” (BJR). The BJR is a common law doctrine that 
presumes that “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted 
on an informed basis . . . and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the 
best interests of the company.”12 As students of corporate law are well aware, 
the BJR transmutes what is ostensibly a negligence standard to one that can 
perhaps best be characterized as “gross negligence.” Violations are found only 
where there is “reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the interests 
of the whole body of stockholders”13 or actions which are “without the bounds 
of reason.”14 Gross negligence is best shown by following proper process—put 
succinctly, “[p]rocess review is, of course, duty of care review.”15 As a 
consequence, review under the BJR is largely outcome-determinative and 
defendants often win.16 
To be sure, there is one famous counter-example in duty of care 
jurisprudence where a CEO and directors were found to be “grossly 
negligent”—Smith v. Van Gorkom.17 As Professor Roe emphasizes, “[o]ne does 
not exaggerate much by saying that American corporate law has produced only 
one major instance in which nonconflicted managers were held liable to pay for 
their mismanagement: Smith v. Van Gorkom, a decision excoriated by managers 
and their lawyers, and one promptly overturned.”18 But even Van Gorkom is 
problematic, since sophisticated commentators suggest that it is really a hostile 
 
 11. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01, at 181 (AM. 
LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 1992); cf. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 
2002). 
 12. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The BJR “operates to preclude a court from 
imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.” Cede v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 
360 (Del. 1993). 
 13. Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929). 
 14. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 15. Sean J. Griffith, The Good Faith Thaumatrope: A Model of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence 
37 (Dec. 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=571121. As three prominent Delaware judges themselves 
admit, the BJR “is not, functionally speaking, a standard of review at all. Rather, it is an expression of a policy 
of non-review of a board of directors’ decision when a judge has already performed the crucial task of 
determining that certain conditions exist.” Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, supra note 10, at 870. 
 16. See Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, supra note 10, at 867 (“A judicial standard of review is a value-laden 
analytical instrument that reflects fundamental policy judgments. In corporate law, a judicial standard of review 
is a verbal expression that describes the task a court performs in determining whether action by corporate 
directors violated their fiduciary duty.”); see also id. at 869 (“[S]tandards of review reflect significant value 
judgments about the social utility of permitting greater or lesser insulation of director conduct from judicial 
scrutiny.”). 
 17. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 18. See Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, supra note 2, at 243 (footnote omitted). 
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takeover case, not a duty of care one—in other words, the real worry of the 
Delaware Supreme Court was the “lock up” to Pritzker, to the detriment of other 
bidders.19 
Alternatively, as I argue in Subpart III.A, Van Gorkom may in fact best be 
conceptualized as a disclosure case.20 Notwithstanding Van Gorkom’s seeming 
bite, a statute allowing a waiver of duty of care claims for monetary damages 
was enacted a few months after the Van Gorkom decision was handed down.21 
Thus, put simply, shareholder-plaintiffs cannot even remotely count on the duty 
of care to help them.22 
The duty of loyalty is admittedly more shareholder-plaintiff friendly. This 
duty “mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes 
precedence over any interest possessed by a director, officer, or controlling 
shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally.”23 In examining the 
modern doctrine, it is important to reflect on a threshold question: there is no 
prophylactic ban against self-dealing transactions.24 As a baseline standard of 
review, as long as the conflicted fiduciary can show that the transaction is “fair,” 
the transaction passes muster.25 However, if the fiduciary’s lawyers are 
sophisticated, they will recognize that approval from an “independent” body—
disinterested directors or unaffiliated shareholders—will provide relief from this 
baseline standard of review. After approval from an independent body, if the 
conflicted fiduciary is a director or officer, she will, perhaps shockingly, enjoy 
 
 19. Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which It Is 
Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877, 
902 (2005); see also Robert T. Miller, Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Kobayashi Maru: The Place of the Trans 
Union Case in the Development of Delaware Corporate Law, 9 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 65, 73–76 (2017) 
(“Van Gorkom was an attempt by the Delaware Supreme Court to begin working out a regime to regulate 
negotiated transactions. Van Gorkom should have been Revlon, and what the Delaware Supreme Court got wrong 
in Van Gorkom in January of 1985 it would get right in Revlon in November of that year.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 20. See infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 21. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018). For a discussion of section 102(b)(7) in the context of 
the duty of good faith, see infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 22. As one commentator summarizes: 
A director is only liable if he or she is grossly negligent, and the rule presumes that the director acted 
with due care. . . . If the company has an exculpatory provision in its articles of incorporation, as 
nearly all publicly-held corporations do, the plaintiff-shareholder must prove that the director failed 
to act in good faith or intentionally harmed the corporation. As if these legal standards were not 
enough to reduce a director’s incentives to act with care, directors invariably have indemnification 
rights and insurance, and courts have limited the ability of shareholders to obtain discovery in 
derivative actions alleging director misconduct. 
Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 377–78 (footnotes omitted). 
 23. Cede v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). 
 24. See Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 334 (2002) 
(“[T]he decisional law has recognized a relaxation of the rigor of trust law, primarily with respect to tolerance 
of self-dealing transactions.”). 
 25. See, e.g., Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 
1988). 
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BJR deference.26 And even a controlling shareholder as a conflicted fiduciary 
will obtain a burden shift; that is, the plaintiff will still need to make a prima 
facie case that the transaction is “unfair.”27  
Emerging jurisprudential trends only heighten these liberalizations of 
doctrine. First, recent cases—notably In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders 
Litigation,28 in the context of controlled tender offers and Kahn v. M & F 
Worldwide Corp.,29 in the context of controlled mergers—suggest that in the 
context of these specific controlled transactions, even controlling shareholders 
can enjoy BJR deference if they get approval from both unconflicted board 
members and unaffiliated shareholders.  
The Delaware judiciary could easily extend this jurisprudence more 
generally to conflicted transactions involving controlling shareholders, thereby 
further loosening the doctrine described above. Second, one might have argued 
that at least Delaware jurisprudence paid some attention to shareholder concerns 
in the context of mergers and acquisitions, notably hostile tender offers. To the 
extent this might have been correct, however, it “focuses on a few discrete areas 
of corporate governance that are more limited and occur more sporadically than 
might be expected for a plenary governance system.”30 Perhaps even more 
importantly, new takeover jurisprudence, such as Lyondell Chemical Co. v. 
Ryan31 and C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees32, 
chip away at what is arguably the most important shareholder-plaintiff friendly 
case of the “golden era” of Delaware takeover jurisprudence, Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.33 If one combines this with allowing 
waivers of the corporate opportunity doctrine34—not to mention a move to allow 
waivers of the duty of loyalty in unincorporated associations35—the future of the 
duty of loyalty as a tool to protect shareholders looks quite bleak. 
 
 26. See, e.g., Cooke v. Oolie, No. 11134, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92, at *33 (Del. Ch. June 23, 1997). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1200–01, 1204 (Del. Ch. 
1995) (still finding a reviewing function for courts even where the challenged transaction is approved, but finding 
the plaintiff did not shift the burden). Note that courts have been true to the language of the so-called “safe 
harbor” statutes. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.61 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2002); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2018). 
 28. C.A. No. 5377-VCL, 2010 WL 2291842 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010). 
 29. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), overruled by Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2018). 
 30. Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the First State as 
First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 788 (2004). 
 31. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
 32. 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014). 
 33. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 34. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2018) (giving a Delaware corporation the power to “[r]enounce, 
in its certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors, any interest or expectancy of the 
corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity to participate in, specified business opportunities or specified 
classes or categories of business opportunities that are presented to the corporation or 1 or more of its officers, 
directors or stockholders”). 
 35. The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act aims, for instance, “to give the maximum effect to the 
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.” DEL. CODE 
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Waste and good faith are even weaker. Plaintiffs have been singularly 
unsuccessful at arguing “waste,”36 even though several million or even billion 
dollars were at stake.37 For predictable reasons, courts do not want to venture 
into the adequacy of consideration in corporate transactions. For its part, good 
faith has been a disappointment post-Disney. Consider the pre-Disney 
aspirations expressed by thoughtful commentators espousing a synthetic view of 
good faith: 
Whether the question is confronted from the angle of the duty of care or the duty 
of loyalty is just a difference in approach. To put it another way, the fundamental 
question underlying both duties really is good faith. Are the directors doing their 
best in acting for someone else? Arguably, that is the only question in all of 
corporate law. It is simply asked in different ways in different contexts.38 
Juxtapose this lofty idea with the jurisprudential reality in Disney, which 
set a very low bar for “good faith” by noting that “the concept of intentional 
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities, is an 
appropriate (although not the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries 
have acted in good faith.”39 It is now even unclear whether good faith is an 
independent fiduciary duty. For instance, the Delaware Supreme Court has 
suggested that: 
[A]lthough good faith may be described colloquially as part of a “triad” of 
fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act 
in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the 
same footing as the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where 
violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good faith may 
do so, but indirectly.40 
To the extent that good faith is not conceptualized as an independent duty, 
it renders the exculpation provision in DGCL section 102(b)(7) problematic, 
given that the statute seems to treat three distinct fiduciary duties: care, loyalty, 
and good faith.41 
Surveying the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith suggests an 
overarching theme: from the point of view of a shareholder-plaintiff, state 
fiduciary duties are weak. As one commentator summarizes it: 
 
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (West 2019); see also Pappas v. Tzolis, 982 N.E.2d 576, 579–80 (N.Y. 2012) (allowing 
fiduciaries to contract out of fiduciary obligations). For a general discussion of this issue, see generally Reza 
Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TULSA L. REV. 451 (2006). 
 36. To show waste, plaintiffs must prove “an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of 
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.” Glazer v. 
Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993). 
 37. See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, 
at *14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 38. Griffith, supra note 15, at 47 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 39. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 755 (emphasis omitted). 
 40. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (2006) (footnote omitted); cf. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 
753 (“Decisions from the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery are far from clear with respect to 
whether there is a separate fiduciary duty of good faith.”). 
 41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018). 
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Over time, state courts interpreted the [fiduciary] duties in a manner that left 
little substance. The business judgment rule and universal adoption of waiver of 
liability provisions all but eliminated causes of action for breach of the duty of 
care. The duty of loyalty, particularly self-dealing by officers and directors, could 
be validated through procedural mechanisms. With proper procedures, the 
fairness of the transaction was not subject to judicial review. This approach 
allowed self-dealing by officers and directors almost without limits.42 
As William Bratton and Joseph McCahery succinctly put it: “the genius of 
Delaware lawmakers lies in their ability to generate a thick fiduciary law without 
at the same time imposing a significant compliance burden.”43 
II.  THE REGRETTABLY BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE 
As the Delaware Supreme Court has noted, the “fiduciary duty of 
disclosure is somewhat nebulous.”44 An overview of its history, however, may 
prove instructive.45 While there are some suggestions of a duty of candor in the 
early and mid-twentieth century,46 the modern duty emerged in 1977 with Lynch 
v. Vickers.47 In Lynch, a former shareholder argued that the controlling 
shareholder provided incomplete disclosure in the context of a going-private 
tender offer.48 The Delaware Supreme Court held “that it was a breach of the 
fiduciary duty of candor for defendants to fail to disclose the Harrell estimate to 
 
 42. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 
38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 318–19 (2004) (footnotes omitted); see also Leo E. Strine, A Response to Kahan & 
Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1279 (2001) 
(“Delaware corporate law generally permits corporate managers wide flexibility and errs on the side of 
managerial freedom.”). 
 43. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 4, at 691. 
 44. In re Transkaryotic Therapies, 954 A.2d 346, 357 (Del. 2008). 
 45. For a thorough review of the history of the duty of disclosure, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling 
Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996). 
Hamermesh notes that “[a] reconsideration of the historical and varied contexts of fiduciary disclosure duties 
and an examination of how those contexts largely dovetail with generally accepted rationales of fiduciary 
doctrine should contribute to a more precise and justifiable development and application of fiduciary disclosure 
duties in future cases.” Id. at 1177. 
 46. See Empire S. Gas Co. v. Gray, 46 A.2d 741, 746 (Del. Ch. 1946) (“The accepted and desirable 
tendency has been to place the burden of candor upon those who would communicate with stockholders rather 
than to require the stockholders to be eternally vigilant.”); Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224, 234 (Del. Ch. 1921) 
(“The burden is on him who relies on a ratification to show that it was made with a full knowledge of all material 
facts.”). There is also a nineteenth-century Delaware statute which reads: 
If the directors or officers of any corporation organized under the provisions of this Act, shall 
knowingly cause to be published or given out any written statement or report of the condition or 
business of the corporation that is false in any material respect, the officers or directors causing such 
report or statement to be published, or given out, or assenting thereto, shall be jointly and severally, 
individually liable for any loss or damage resulting therefrom. 
21 Del. Laws 451 (1899). While some commentators suggest this is the earliest articulation of the duty of candor, 
it is more likely simply a codification of common law fraud. See Hamermesh, supra note 45, at 1104. 
 47. 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977). 
 48. See id. at 281 (“[T]he limited function of the Court was to determine whether defendants had disclosed 
all information in their possession germane to the transaction in issue.”). 
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those persons to whom they owed the duty and whose stock Vickers was 
attempting to acquire.”49 
Nine years later, in a case from 1986, In re Anderson, Clayton 
Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court extended the duty of 
candor from controlling shareholders to boards of directors.50 The case was 
litigated in the context of a corporate recapitalization; as such, as in Lynch, there 
was a call to shareholder action. In the words of the court, “[i]t is established by 
our law that one element of the fiduciary duty that directors of a Delaware 
corporation owe to shareholders is the duty to provide full and honest disclosure 
of material facts relating to any transaction that requires shareholder 
approval.”51 Beyond its extension to boards of directors, Anderson Clayton also 
applied a “materiality” standard that the Delaware courts have taken directly 
from federal law.52 
Similarly, the case of Stroud v. Grace concerned the validity of the notice 
of an annual meeting as well as the charter amendments and bylaws adopted at 
that meeting.53 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that “Delaware law 
imposes upon a board of directors the fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly 
all material aspects within its control that would have a significant effect upon a 
stockholder vote.”54 Significantly, however, the court refused to extend the duty 
of disclosure beyond specific disclosures.55  
Perhaps the most significant open question in the 1990s regarding the duty 
of disclosure was whether or not the duty was implicated in situations where 
there was no call to shareholder action. Some Court of Chancery decisions 
 
 49. Id. (emphasis added). 
 50. See 519 A.2d 680, 689–90 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944–45 (Del. 1985) (“[A] showing of a substantial 
likelihood that, under all of the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the 
deliberations of a reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered 
the ‘total mix’ of information available.” (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 
(1976))). The landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases are TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. 438, which developed the 
materiality standard in the context of proxy solicitations, and Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), which 
extended the materiality standard beyond proxy solicitations and rejected a bright-line approach. 
 53. 606 A.2d 75, 78 (Del. 1992). 
 54. Id. at 85. 
 55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222 (West 2019) (“Whenever stockholders are required or permitted 
to take any action at a meeting, a written notice of the meeting shall be given which shall state the place, if any, 
date and hour of the meeting . . . .”); id. § 242(b)(1) (“Every amendment authorized by subsection (a) of this 
section shall be made and effected in the following manner: (1) If the corporation has capital stock, its board of 
directors shall adopt a resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability, and either 
calling a special meeting of the stockholders entitled to vote in respect thereof for the consideration of such 
amendment or directing that the amendment proposed be considered at the next annual meeting of the 
stockholders . . . Such special or annual meeting shall be called and held upon notice in accordance with § 222 
of this title.”); see also Stroud, 606 A.2d at 86 (“All of our previous decisions involving disclosure requirements, 
and subsequent shareholder ratification, involved proxy solicitations. In the absence of that circumstance, 
questions of disclosure beyond those mandated by statute become less compelling.”). 
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suggested yes;56 others, no.57 Interestingly, the well-known 1996 Delaware 
Supreme Court case Kahn v. Roberts consciously ducked the question.58 It was 
not until Malone v. Brincat, in 1998, that the court suggested that the duty 
applies even in the absence of a request for shareholder action: 
Whenever directors communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about the 
corporation’s affairs, with or without a request for shareholder action, directors 
have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith, and loyalty. 
It follows a fortiori that when directors communicate publicly or directly with 
shareholders about corporate matters the sine qua non of directors’ fiduciary duty 
to shareholders is honesty.59 
III.  THE CENTRALITY OF DISCLOSURE 
A. LACUNA, VAN GORKOM, WEINBERGER, AND CAREMARK 
At first glance, the duty of disclosure appears as a bleak candidate. The 
duty, which in its traditional form “obligates directors to provide the 
stockholders with accurate and complete information material to a transaction 
or other corporate event that is being presented to them for action,”60 is 
sometimes noted not even to be its own independent duty. A leading case 
suggests it derives merely “from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, 
loyalty, and good faith.”61 As if this were not devastating enough, any state duty 
of disclosure is generally believed to be eclipsed by federal disclosure 
obligations.62 
The duty of disclosure, however, deserves a fresh look. First, as Professor 
Faith Stevelman Kahn perceptively noted, the duty of disclosure cannot be 
separated from fundamental questions in corporate governance: 
 
 56. See, e.g., Levy ex rel. Durex, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Stern, No. 11955, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25, at 
*3–8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 687 A.2d 573 (Del. 1996) (unpublished table decision); 
Freedman v. Rest. Assocs. Indus., Inc., No. 9212, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142, at *13–16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 
1990). 
 57. See, e.g., Bragger v. Budacz, No. 13376, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *16–21 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1994); 
Herd v. Major Realty Corp., No. 10707, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211, at *27–37 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990). 
 58. The Kahn court observed: 
This Court has held that full disclosure is required when management is seeking stockholder action. 
Notably, this Court has never stated that full disclosure is required only when seeking shareholder 
action. Because none of the disclosure violations alleged by Kahn are material, we need not and do 
not reach today the question of whether a duty of disclosure exists absent shareholder action. Even 
if the duty of disclosure is implicated here, such a duty lacks a factual basis. 
679 A.2d 460, 467 (Del. 1996) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 
 59. 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (emphasis added); see also infra notes 143–144 and accompanying text. 
 60. Brincat, 722 A.2d at 10. 
 61. Id. at 11. 
 62. See, e.g., Eric A. Chiappinelli, The Moral Basis of State Corporate Law Disclosure, 49 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 697, 698 (2000) (“Thus, even though state disclosure obligations remained moribund, the federal 
government imposed the appropriate solution on corporate America.”); Hamermesh, supra note 45, at 1090 
(“Although these state common law doctrines have been applied to transactions in corporate securities, their 
significance has been largely eclipsed by comprehensive federal regulation.”). 
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[C]orporate disclosure must be studied as an aspect of corporate governance 
because shareholders cannot exercise their governance rights—including their 
right to determine whether to hold or to sell their shares on an informed basis—
without adequate, accurate information about their firms’ financial condition and 
material business affairs. This principle is axiomatic, and indeed self-evident as 
it relates to shareholder voting. The dysfunctionality of shareholders’ rights to 
vote (which arise under state corporation law), without rights to receive 
adequate, accurate information (which are afforded public companies’ 
shareholders by virtue of the federal proxy laws and regulations) accounts for 
why most basic courses, notwithstanding a nod to the concept of “rational 
shareholder apathy,” include a discussion of the federal proxy regulations and 
the disclosures to shareholders required thereunder.63 
Stevelman Kahn’s point is a profound one: how can state corporate law 
purport to regulate corporate governance without a concomitant duty of 
disclosure? Why must we resort to teaching federal proxy rules?64 
Second, and relatedly, the duty of disclosure necessarily appears without 
properly being acknowledged. Consider, for instance, Smith v. Van Gorkom65—
a canonical case in the lexicon of business associations. Van Gorkom is known 
to generations of law students as a duty of care case—where the board of 
directors and TransUnion were found to be grossly negligent in “negotiating” 
the sale of the company to the Pritzker family.66 But a careful reading of the 
opinion suggests that the case is at least as much about disclosure as it might be 
about care. The terms “candor” and “disclosure” appear multiple times in the 
opinion, and the court concludes: 
To summarize: we hold that the directors of Trans Union breached their 
fiduciary duty to their stockholders (1) by their failure to inform themselves of 
all information reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to 
recommend the Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material 
information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in 
deciding whether to approve the Pritzker offer.67 
So, why is Van Gorkom not studied as a disclosure case? 
Similarly, consider Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,68 a classic case typically 
poured over for its analysis of the duty of loyalty and the “fair dealing and “fair 
 
 63. Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s 
Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 515–16 (2000) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
 64. Cf. Brincat, 722 A.2d at 11 (“In the absence of a request for stockholder action, the Delaware General 
Corporation Law does not require directors to provide shareholders with information concerning the finances or 
affairs of the corporation. Even when shareholder action is sought, the provisions in the General Corporation 
Law requiring notice to the shareholders of the proposed action do not require the directors to convey substantive 
information beyond a statutory minimum.” (footnote omitted)). 
 65. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 
2009). 
 66. Id. at 874. 
 67. Id. at 893; see also id. at 890 (“[T]he Board was required to disclose ‘all germane facts’ which a 
reasonable shareholder would have considered important in deciding whether to approve the merger.”). 
 68. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
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price” aspects of loyalty analysis.69 But at its core, Weinberger may also hinge 
on disclosure—as students of corporations law remember, arguably the key 
factor against the defendants was the non-disclosure of a report stating that the 
acquirer would be willing to go beyond the price offered,70 as well as non-
disclosure of how the investment bank reached its valuation.71 Another good 
example is In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.72 While the 
case is typically studied as a “duty to monitor” case under duty of care, there is 
also an under-appreciated component that revolves around disclosure. 
Specifically, Chancellor Allen noted, “the elementary fact that relevant and 
timely information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the board’s 
supervisory and monitoring role under Section 141 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law.”73 As Stevelman Kahn notes: 
William Allen’s now famous dicta in In re Caremark International, Inc. 
Derivative Litigation indicates that managers will be looked to, as a matter of 
fiduciary care, to administer appropriate, efficacious systems of internal 
information-gathering and reporting. In addition, Allen’s acknowledgment in 
Caremark of directors’ responsibilities for overseeing internal information-
gathering and reporting systems has established a doctrinal and conceptual 
foundation, albeit retrospectively, for the Delaware Supreme Court’s recognition 
of directors’ obligations to monitor the integrity of their firms’ public disclosures 
in the interest of shareholders, as was first articulated in the court’s 1985 Van 
Gorkom decision.74 
B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AS DISGUISED DUTY OF DISCLOSURE PUZZLES 
1. Section 220 “Books and Records” Requests 
One of the contributions that a robust duty of candor could make would be 
to bring some clarity to the increasingly confusing doctrine that has emerged 
 
 69. See id. at 711 (“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former 
embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to 
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of 
fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant 
factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or 
inherent value of a company’s stock.”). 
 70. See id. at 712 (“As we have noted, the matter of disclosure to the UOP directors was wholly flawed by 
the conflicts of interest raised by the Arledge-Chitiea report. All of those conflicts were resolved by Signal in its 
own favor without divulging any aspect of them to UOP.”); see also id. at 707 (“Furthermore, it is clear beyond 
peradventure that nothing in that report was ever disclosed to UOP’s minority shareholders prior to their approval 
of the merger.”). 
 71. See id. at 708 (“The proxy statement indicated that the vote of UOP’s board in approving the merger 
had been unanimous. It also advised the shareholders that Lehman Brothers had given its opinion that the merger 
price of $21 per share was fair to UOP’s minority. However, it did not disclose the hurried method by which this 
conclusion was reached.” (emphasis added)); cf. Jack B. Jacobs, The Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure After Dabit, 
2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 391, 398 (2007) (“In interested transactions, the duty [of disclosure] is an element of “fair 
dealing,” which in turn is a critical component of entire fairness review.”). 
 72. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 73. Id. at 970. 
 74. Stevelman Kahn, supra note 63, at 511 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). 
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around DGCL section 220, “Inspection of Books and Records.”75 This provision 
in the Delaware code allows a stockholder or her agent “upon written demand 
under oath stating the purpose thereof, . . . the right . . . to inspect for any proper 
purpose”76 both the stock ledger and “books and records.”77 While obtaining 
access to the shareholder list is usually non-controversial,78 recent controversies 
abound over what “proper purpose” means with respect to other “books and 
records”—notably because the statute offers little guidance other than to note 
that a “proper purpose shall mean a purpose reasonably related to such person’s 
interest as a stockholder.”79 There is also similar broad guidance from the 
Delaware Supreme Court that states that the “plaintiff bears the burden of 
proving that each category of books and records is essential to the 
accomplishment of the stockholder’s articulated purpose for the inspection.”80 
Perhaps the drafters of section 220 did not foresee how important it would 
become. With the advent of heightened standards and “particularized facts” in 
pleadings, the plaintiffs’ bar has increasingly turned to “books and records” 
requests in an attempt to obtain more detailed facts in complaints to try to survive 
motions to dismiss81 or the demand requirement in derivative suits.82 As such, 
and given the ambiguity around “proper purpose,” litigants have increasingly 
turned to the Chancery Court to determine the scope of inspection rights—as 
specifically contemplated by the statute.83 
A growing common law around section 220 has emerged in the face of 
disputes between stockholders and corporations. For example, can a stockholder 
 
 75. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2019). 
 76. Id. § 220(b). 
 77. Id. § 220(b)(1). 
 78. See, e.g., Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 240 A.2d 755, 755–56 (1968). With respect to 
obtention of a stockholder list, the statute specifically places the burden on the stockholder. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 220(c) (“Where the stockholder seeks to inspect the corporation’s stock ledger or list of 
stockholders . . . the burden of proof shall be upon the corporation to establish that the inspection such 
stockholder seeks is for an improper purpose.”). 
 79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b). 
 80. Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 569 (Del. 1997). 
 81. See, e.g., In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc., No. C 07-06347 MHP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44138, at *37 
(N.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (suggesting plaintiffs make a section 220 motion to obtain particularized facts for 
complaint). 
 82. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984) (“In Delaware mere directorial approval 
of a transaction, absent particularized facts supporting a breach of fiduciary duty claim, or otherwise establishing 
the lack of independence or disinterestedness of a majority of the directors, is insufficient to excuse demand.”); 
cf. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (1993) (“Nothing requires the Court of Chancery, or any other 
court having appropriate jurisdiction, to countenance this process by penalizing diligent counsel who has 
employed these methods, including section 220, in a deliberate and thorough manner in preparing a complaint 
that meets the demand excused test of Aronson.”). 
 83. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (“If the corporation . . . refuses to permit an inspection sought by 
a stockholder or attorney or other agent acting for the stockholder . . . or does not reply to the demand within 5 
business days after the demand has been made, the stockholder may apply to the Court of Chancery for an order 
to compel such inspection. The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
whether or not the person seeking inspection is entitled to the inspection sought.” (emphasis added)).  
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inspect books and records that pre-date the stockholder’s purchase of stock?84 
Does a shareholder lose standing for the purposes of section 220 if there will be 
a merger?85 How broadly may information obtained from a section 220 request 
be shared?86 What effect does an exculpatory provision in a corporate charter 
have on a section 220 request?87 
A dizzying array of line-drawing exercises exists. For example, it is proper 
to use section 220 to inquire as to violations of fiduciary duties,88 but the 
shareholder must demonstrate that there is a reasonable basis to suspect 
wrongdoing.89 In a similar vein, it is proper to use section 220 to solicit 
proxies90—but the request must be significantly limited because of a perceived 
risk of abuse in this context.91 In another application, it is proper to use a section 
220 to investigate a discrepancy in financial reports,92 but using a section 220 
 
 84. See Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 117 (Del. 2002) (“Even where a stockholder’s only 
purpose is to gather information for a derivative suit, the date of his or her stock purchase should not be used as 
an automatic ‘cut-off’ date in a § 220 action.”). 
 85. See Deephaven Risk Arb Trading, Ltd. v. UnitedGlobalCom, Inc., No. 379-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
107, at *17–27 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2005) (standing preserved). But see Weingarten v. Monster Worldwide, Inc., 
No. 12931-VCG, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 31, at *11–14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2017). 
 86. The Delaware Chancery Court provides the following guidance: 
  The court understands that there can be exigent circumstances (e.g., an active election contest) in 
which time constraints will not allow a stockholder to draft and file a complaint and then deal with 
issues of confidentiality in the ordinary course. In those limited circumstances, and upon a clear 
showing, this court will entertain extraordinary applications to remove “confidential” designations 
from documents produced as the result of a Section 220 proceeding. In other circumstances, however, 
a stockholder making a books and records demand can expect that documents designated as 
confidential pursuant to a reasonable confidentiality agreement will remain confidential unless the 
stockholder concludes that grounds exist to initiate litigation and the court in which that proceeding 
is brought determines to include those documents in the public record. 
Disney v. Walt Disney Co., 857 A.2d 444, 450 (Del. Ch. 2004); see also Hurd v. Espinoza, 34 A.3d 1084, 1086 
(Del. 2011) (“The Allred letter does not contain any nonpublic financial information, trade secrets, or other 
proprietary information. The question thus becomes whether the letter contains third-party confidential 
information. Several factors support the trial court’s conclusion that it does not. . . . [W]e conclude that the Court 
of Chancery acted well within its discretion in holding that the Allred letter (as redacted) should be unsealed.”); 
Pershing Square, L.P. v. Ceridian Corp., 923 A.2d 810, 817–24 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“This Court is required under 
8 Del. C. § 220 to ensure that a stockholder’s primary purpose in demanding access to corporate books and 
records is proper and to prevent abusive use of such demands. Where those elements are in doubt, the Court will 
use its statutory powers to deny relief. . . . Pershing Square initiated this § 220 action with a single objective in 
mind: to find a legal mechanism by which it can publicly broadcast otherwise improperly obtained and 
confidential information. This does not state a proper purpose.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 785–86 (Del. Ch. 2016); Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth. v. AbbVie Inc., C.A. No. 10374-VCG, C.A. No. 1408-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *39–46 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 15, 2015). 
 88. See, e.g., Nodana Petroleum Corp. v. State ex rel. Brennan, 123 A.2d 243, 246 (Del. 1956). 
 89. See, e.g., Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 123 (Del. 2006). 
 90. See, e.g., Hatleigh Corp. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 428 A.2d 350, 352 (Del. Ch. 1981). 
 91. See, e.g., Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., v. Motient Corp., 906 A.2d 156, 164 (Del. Ch. 2006) 
(“Recent experience teaches that the potential for abuse is very much alive when the Section 220 demand is 
made—as this one is—in the context of an impending or ongoing proxy contest.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., No. 18105, No. 18499, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
126, at *23–37 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2001). 
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request as part of an attempt to have a corporation change its financial reporting 
practices is improper.93 Or a plaintiff can use section 220 to revisit the issue of 
demand futility after a derivative suit has been dismissed without prejudice, but 
not when it has been dismissed with prejudice.94 
The Delaware courts are also not consistent on how specific the stated 
purpose in a books and records request should be. For instance, one case holds 
that stating “[t]he purpose of this request is to enable the B. F. Goodrich 
Company to communicate with the other stockholders of our company with 
reference to a special meeting of the stockholders of your company” is 
“insufficient[ly]” specific,95 whereas another court holds that stating “for the 
purpose of communicating with them on matters relating to our mutual interest 
as stockholders and for the purpose of soliciting their proxies in connection with 
the annual meeting of stockholders” is “sufficient.”96 There are even 
controversies as to a director’s ability to use section 220 to obtain access to 
books and records.97 And while section 220(c) applies to a corporation’s 
subsidiaries, even defining what a “subsidiary” is has become a point of 
contention.98 The most recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion on books and 
records requests takes an expansive view of section 220: discussing when email 
communications may be inspected, and frowning upon restrictions on the 
jurisdictions in which the books and records obtained may be used.99 
The root of the problem is that voting is a central paradigm in corporate 
governance, but there is no concomitant duty to receive information. The only 
thing shareholders have under Delaware state law is section 220, which results 
in intense litigation. To the extent a robust duty of disclosure would make 
information available ex ante, then much of this can be avoided. 
This emerging mess exists because of a lack of an overarching framework 
for the duty of disclosure—to the extent such a framework can be introduced, 
the problem can be managed much more effectively. 
 
 93. See, e.g., Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 685 A.2d 702, 712 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
 94. See, e.g., King v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc., 12 A.3d. 1140, 1148–49 (Del. 2011). 
 95. Nw. Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 260 A.2d 428, 428–29 (Del. 1969). 
 96. Kerkorian v. W. Air Lines, Inc., 253 A.2d 221, 222–23 (Del. Ch. 1969) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 97. See, e.g., Kortüm v. Webasto Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 115 (Del Ch. 2000); McGowan v. Empress 
Entm’t, Inc., 791 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 98. See, e.g., Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 505 (Del. 2005) (“Establishing that an entity 
is a ‘subsidiary’ of the corporation that is before the Court of Chancery is a condition precedent to invoking the 
2003 amendment to section 220. As in this case, usually the extent of the parent corporation’s direct or indirect 
ownership will not be an issue. Therefore, the dispositive inquiry in making that determination will be whether 
the stockholder ‘controls the affairs’ of the corporation.”). 
 99. See KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs., Inc., No. 281, 2018, 2019 Del. LEXIS 40, at *27–29 (Del. 
S.C. Jan. 29, 2019). 
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2. Reemergence of State Insider Trading Claims 
Insider trading cases are almost always brought under federal securities 
laws. These federal claims are typically based on section 10(b) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 
The complexity of these claims lies in adapting an interpretation of section 10(b) 
and rule 10b-5 fundamentally based on common law fraud to insider trading on 
electronic securities markets—a task of immense complexity that has led to 
several landmark decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. Additional causes of 
action exist under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, as well as rule 14e-3 
promulgated under section 14(e) of the 1934 Act. 
As such, attorneys do not typically consider insider trading claims as state 
fiduciary duty actions. There is, however, a fascinating mid-twentieth century 
Delaware Chancery Court opinion, Brophy v. Cities Service Co.,100 which 
suggests that insider trading can be conceptualized as a breach of fiduciary 
duty.101 While essentially dormant for decades, there has been a recent 
resurgence of so-called “Brophy” claims.102 This resurgence has brought to the 
fore some complex questions—for instance, whether a shareholder must show 
that the corporation was actually harmed in order to bring a state law claim for 
insider trading,103 or to what extent circumstantial evidence can be evoked to 
establish such a claim.104 
While Brophy claims are conceptualized as breaches of the duty of loyalty, 
perhaps an even stronger argument can be made that they actually represent duty 
of disclosure cases. The analogy here would be to the “disclose or abstain” 
doctrine under federal securities law.105 The point has been under-appreciated in 
the literature, though Professor Lawrence Hamermesh notes that “imposing a 
fiduciary duty of disclosure provides a convenient, ready-made substitute for 
what selling stockholders would want in any event—presentation of the material 
 
 100. 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949). 
 101. See id. at 7 (“But if an employee in the course of his employment acquires secret information relating 
to his employer’s business, he occupies a position of trust and confidence toward it, analogous in most respects 
to that of a fiduciary, and must govern his actions accordingly.”). 
 102. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp., Derivative Litig., 867 A.2d 904, 905 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“The plaintiffs thus 
raise a claim under the venerable case of Brophy v. Cities Service Co.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 23 A.3d 831, 840 (2011) (holding that a 
shareholder need not show actual harm). 
 104. This is particularly relevant in the context of proving scienter. See, e.g., Silverberg v. Gold, No. 7646-
VCP, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 312, at *30–54 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2013) (addressing what facts a plaintiff must 
plead to survive a Brophy motion to dismiss). 
 105. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (“We, and the courts have consistently held 
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not 
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. Failure to 
make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand, 
disclosure prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we 
believe the alternative is to forego the transaction.” (footnote omitted)); see also SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 
446 F.2d 1301, 1304–05 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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facts—and what directors, by virtue of their role as centralized repositories of 
corporate information, are well suited to provide efficiently.”106 The duty may 
emerge in a somewhat disguised and sublimated manner, but it is the under-
appreciated duty of disclosure nonetheless. 
C. “DISCLOSURE-ONLY” AND QUASI-APPRAISAL LITIGATION 
The appraisal right under DGCL section 262 represents a relatively esoteric 
cause of action. A shareholder who dissents from a qualifying merger107 has the 
right to ask a court for her pro-rata share of the fair going-concern value of the 
corporation.108 “Quasi-appraisal” actions relate to appraisals in a perhaps 
counter-intuitive way. Quasi-appraisal is simply a short-hand description of a 
measure of damages. “It refers to the quantum of money equivalent to what a 
stockholder would have received in an appraisal, namely the fair value of the 
stockholder’s proportionate share of the equity of the corporation as a going 
concern.”109 
How does all of this relate to the duty of disclosure? In the words of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery: 
One cause of action where the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of 
Chancery consistently have held that quasi-appraisal damages are available is 
when a fiduciary breaches its duty of disclosure in connection with a transaction 
that requires a stockholder vote. The premise for the award is that without the 
disclosure of false or misleading information, or the failure to disclose material 
information, stockholders could have voted down the transaction and retained 
their proportionate share of the equity in the corporation as a going concern. 
Quasi-appraisal damages serve as a monetary substitute for the proportionate 
share of the equity that the stockholders otherwise would have retained.110 
 
 106. Hamermesh, supra note 45, at 1153; see also id. at 1151 (“The next context in which a fiduciary duty 
of disclosure has been identified is the purchase by a director of the corporation’s stock from an outside 
stockholder.”). 
 107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2019) provides an extraordinarily convoluted treatment of which 
mergers qualify. As a general matter, shareholders of a private company with fewer than 2,000 shareholders will 
qualify for an appraisal remedy assuming they have the right to vote on the merger. Id. § 262(b)(2)(b). By 
contrast, shareholders of a public company, or a private company with 2,000 or more shareholders, do not receive 
appraisal rights in a stock-for-stock deal—where they receive either stock of the acquiror, or stock traded on a 
national securities exchange; however, the shareholder do receive appraisal rights if the consideration they 
receive is cash. See id. § 262(b)(1); see also id. § 262(g). 
 108. In turn, “the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid 
upon the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account 
all relevant factors.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019). Typically, a “discounted cash flow” analysis is 
performed. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 109. In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 42 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 110. Id. at 42; see also Zachary A. Paiva, Note, Quasi-Appraisal: Appraising Breach of Duty of Disclosure 
Claims Following “Cash-Out” Mergers in Delaware, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 339, 342 (2017) (“Based 
on the Delaware Court of Chancery’s ‘fair value’ determination, quasi-appraisal damages attempt to compensate 
minority shareholders for out-of-pocket damages they suffered following the loss of their shares and the breach 
of a controlling shareholder’s duty of disclosure.”(footnote omitted)). 
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Sometimes plaintiffs’ lawyers do not seek monetary remedies, but obtain a 
“disclosure-only” settlement: 
Once the litigation is on an expedited track and the prospect of an injunction 
hearing looms, the most common currency used to procure a settlement is the 
issuance of supplemental disclosures to the target’s stockholders before they are 
asked to vote on the proposed transaction. The theory behind making these 
disclosures is that, by having the additional information, stockholders will be 
better informed when exercising their franchise rights.111 
These settlements have both become common in recent years112—as well 
as roundly criticized by the Delaware courts. Consider, for example, these recent 
and harsh words from the Delaware Court of Chancery: 
Today, the public announcement of virtually every transaction involving the 
acquisition of a public corporation provokes a flurry of class action lawsuits 
alleging that the target’s directors breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to 
sell the corporation for an unfair price. . . . But far too often such litigation serves 
no useful purpose for stockholders. Instead, it serves only to generate fees for 
certain lawyers who are regular players in the enterprise of routinely filing hastily 
drafted complaints on behalf of stockholders on the heels of the public 
announcement of a deal and settling quickly on terms that yield no monetary 
compensation to the stockholders they represent.113 
My point here is not to wade into the normative merits of these arguments. 
Rather, it is to make two related points. First, “quasi-appraisal” and disclosure 
actions are—like insider trading and section 220 actions—causes of action that 
have at their heart the duty of disclosure. Second, recognizing these causes of 
action for what they are could help us ascertain the relative merits of these 
actions. 
Pondering “disclosure-only” and quasi-appraisal remedies also leads into 
consideration of the broader question of remedies for violations of the duty of 
disclosure. Generally speaking, some cases suggest damages, while others 
emphasize equitable relief. As the Malone v. Brincat court suggests: 
Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive false communications 
from directors even in the absence of a request for shareholder action. When the 
directors are not seeking shareholder action, but are deliberately misinforming 
shareholders about the business of the corporation, either directly or by a public 
statement, there is a violation of fiduciary duty. That violation may result in a 
 
 111. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 892 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 887 (“The proposed settlement is of the type often referred to as a ‘disclosure 
settlement.’ It has become the most common method for quickly resolving stockholder lawsuits that are filed 
routinely in response to the announcement of virtually every transaction involving the acquisition of a public 
corporation.”). 
 113. Id. at 891–92; see also id. at 907 (“[N]one of plaintiffs’ Supplemental Disclosures were material or 
even helpful to Trulia’s stockholders. The Proxy already provided a more-than-fair summary of J.P. Morgan’s 
financial analysis in each of the four respects criticized by the plaintiffs.”); In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1067 (Del. Ch. 2015) (“The negotiation process falls at the opposite end of 
the spectrum from the routine disclosure-only settlements, entered into quickly after ritualized quasi-litigation, 
that plague the M & A landscape.”). 
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derivative claim on behalf of the corporation or a cause of action for damages. 
There may also be a basis for equitable relief to remedy the violation.114 
But at a finer level of granularity, there remains significant ambiguity. 
Some case law suggests damages are not an appropriate remedy.115 By contrast, 
other case law emphasizes damages116—though there is a debate as to how 
significant those damages should be.117 As such, consideration of “disclosure-
only” and quasi-appraisal remedies could provide a valuable opportunity to 
assess the intersection of disclosure and remedies more generally. 
D. ANALYTICAL INDEPENDENCE AND FEDERALISM 
1. Analytical Independence from Care, Loyalty, and Good Faith? 
To the extent that courts and commentators might begin to take the duty of 
disclosure seriously, my hope is that it will force a reckoning on two difficult 
questions: whether the duty is analytically independent, and how it might relate 
to federal disclosure obligations. 
First, is the duty of disclosure an independent duty? While there remains 
some controversy,118 the bulk of the case law suggests that the answer is no. The 
Delaware Supreme Court has recently noted that: 
Although usually labeled and described as a duty, the obligation to disclose all 
material facts fairly when seeking shareholder action is merely a specific 
application of the duties of care and loyalty. That it is an application of well-
established duties—rather than an independent duty itself—however, does not 
render this area of law clear.119   
 
 114. 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998) (footnote omitted). 
 115. For instance, one Chancery Court opinion suggests that: 
  Delaware case law recognizes that an after-the-fact damages case is not a precise or efficient 
method by which to remedy disclosure deficiencies. A post-hoc evaluation will necessarily require 
the court to speculate about the effect that certain deficiencies may have had on a stockholder vote 
and to award some less-than-scientifically quantified amount of money damages to rectify any 
perceived harm.  
  Therefore, our cases recognize that it is appropriate for the court to address material disclosure 
problems through the issuance of a preliminary injunction that persists until the problems are 
corrected. 
In re Staples, Inc. S’holders Litig., 792 A.2d 934, 960 (Del. Ch. 2001) (emphasis added). 
 116. See, e.g., In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993) (“[L]aw and policy have 
evolved into a virtual per se rule of damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 141–42 (“Tri-Star [sic] stands only 
for the narrow proposition that, where directors have breached their disclosure duties in a corporate transaction 
that has in turn caused impairment to the economic or voting rights of stockholders, there must at least be an 
award of nominal damages.”). 
 118. See Z. Jill Barclift, Senior Corporate Officers and the Duty of Candor: Do the CEO and CFO Have a 
Duty to Inform?, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 269, 289 (2006) (“Delaware law is somewhat muddled on whether the duty 
to disclose is a separate duty.”); see also id. at 286 (“[I]t remains unclear whether a duty of disclosure is an 
independent duty outside of the transactional communication to shareholders.”). 
 119. In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 357 (Del. 2008) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted); see also Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001) (“We begin by observing that the 
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And, unsurprisingly, the Delaware Chancery Court has followed the 
appellate court in this perspective, as in the famous Disney litigation: 
The Delaware Supreme Court has been clear that outside the recognized fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty (and perhaps good faith), there are not other fiduciary 
duties. In certain circumstances, however, specific applications of the duties of 
care and loyalty are called for, such as. . .the duty of candor or disclosure.120 
Yet it is unsatisfactory simply to say, as for example the court in Brincat 
does, that “[t]he duty of directors to observe proper disclosure requirements 
derives from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good 
faith.”121 As students of corporate law know, each of these fiduciary duties 
espouses a different set of doctrines—for instance, a very permissive BJR 
standard for duty of care,122 fairness for loyalty,123 and “intentional dereliction 
of duty” for good faith.124 Under what doctrines should disclosure be analyzed? 
It is not enough to note, for instance, that “[t]he duty of disclosure is, and always 
has been, a specific application of the general fiduciary duty owed by 
directors.”125 More generally, and without wading into an abstract philosophical 
discussion, it remains unclear to me why “candor” or “disclosure” is not an 
analytical duty independent from care, loyalty, and good faith. After all, a 
fiduciary might conceivably meet these three standards without being candid. 
To the extent the duty of disclosure is an after-thought in our jurisprudence, these 
questions can be swept under the rug—but to the extent its importance is 
affirmed, then they cannot be avoided. 
Bringing the duty of disclosure out from under the shadows of care, loyalty, 
and good faith will allow courts and commentators to finally address some novel 
questions. First, should the duty of disclosure be conceptualized as extending 
beyond communications to shareholders? If so, then as former Delaware 
 
board’s fiduciary duty of disclosure . . . is not an independent dut[y] but the application in a specific context of 
the board’s fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.”); Brincat, 722 A.2d at 10 (“The issue in this case 
is not whether Mercury’s directors breached their duty of disclosure. It is whether they breached their more 
general fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith by knowingly disseminating to the stockholders false information 
about the financial condition of the company.”). 
 120. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.400 (Del. Ch. 2005); see also In re Tyson 
Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d. 563, 597–98 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[W]here there is reason to believe 
that the board lacked good faith in approving a disclosure, the violation implicates the duty of loyalty.”); In re 
CheckFree Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 3193-CC, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 148, at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007) (“This 
‘duty of disclosure’ is not a separate and distinct fiduciary duty, but it clearly does impose requirements on a 
corporation’s board.”). 
 121. Brincat, 722 A.2d at 11. 
 122. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (“[T]he substitution of 
someone else’s business judgment for that of the directors ‘is no business for any court to follow.’” (quoting 
Holmes v. Saint Joseph Lead Co., 147 N.Y.S. 104, 107 (Sup. Ct. 1914))). 
 123. See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 124. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64–66 (Del. 2006) (upholding the Chancery 
Court’s articulation of this standard). 
 125. Brincat, 722 A.2d at 10. 
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Supreme Court Justice Joseph Walsh suggests, then perhaps it cannot be 
subsumed within the duty of loyalty: 
The responsibility to consider merger or sale of the corporation has been 
generally viewed as falling under the directors’ duty of loyalty and occasionally 
the limited application of the duty of care. There is, however, another aspect of 
the directors’ fiduciary duty that is increasingly emerging as a matter of 
concern—I refer to the duty of disclosure. More and more, directors are sought 
to be held accountable for what they disclose or fail to disclose to shareholders 
and other parties affected by the financial health, or lack thereof, of the 
corporation. If the duty of disclosure affects only the interests of the shareholders 
it may be deemed to be subsumed within the duty of loyalty, but the duty of 
disclosure may have wider implications.126 
Second, should the duty of disclosure be identical for different 
fiduciaries—directors, officers, or controlling shareholders?127 Given officers’ 
roles in corporate scandals, should the duty of disclosure emphasize the 
obligations of officers?128 Third, do the exculpatory provisions in the well-
known waiver permitted by DGCL section 102(b)(7) apply to the duty of 
disclosure?129 More broadly, might section 102(b)(7) be someday revised to 
include a duty of disclosure—given that today it only references care, loyalty 
and good faith? 
2. Thorny Questions of Federalism 
A second question is the relationship between a state law duty of disclosure 
and federal disclosure requirements. Traditionally, the state duty of disclosure 
has paled vis-à-vis the federal duties.130 And to the extent the duty of disclosure 
 
 126. Justice Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 337 (2002). 
 127. See, e.g., Barclift, supra note 118, at 270 (“[A]ccepting the fact that senior corporate officers and 
directors owe the same fiduciary duties fails to acknowledge the nature of the agency relationship that exists 
between officers and directors, and between officers and shareholders.”). 
 128. As one commentator observes: 
State corporation law has implications for future corporate scandals, which are likely to involve 
intentional misconduct by corporate officers and concealment of that misconduct from the board of 
directors. Extending the duty of candor beyond its current application, as a duty that directors owe 
to disclose material information to the shareholders, would provide a way to seek redress for harm 
to the corporation that the board may not seek otherwise. 
Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 
34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 274 (2009). 
 129. See, e.g., Hamermesh, supra note 45, at 1095–96 (“So long as the courts characterize the director’s 
fiduciary disclosure duty as an ill-defined hybrid of the duties of care and loyalty, directors and corporate counsel 
will be uncertain as to whether exculpatory provisions in the certificate of incorporation can effectively limit or 
eliminate damages liability for breach of that fiduciary disclosure duty.” (footnote omitted)); see also Holly M. 
Barbera, Note, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations: Resolving Questions After Malone v. Brincat, 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 581–83 (2001). 
 130. See, e.g., Stevelman Kahn, supra note 63, at 520–21 (“Because the federal securities laws and 
regulations define the reporting system operating in public companies, and because the federal securities laws 
have historically been of preeminent importance in defining private causes of action for investors seeking 
recovery for losses caused by corporate misrepresentation, the primary legal development and study of the 
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has been asserted, the traditional approach has been to duck the question by 
arguing that state law only applies if shareholders are requested to take action. 
As Justice Walsh has observed: 
For many years the duty of disclosure was primarily a concern of federal law 
directed to the issuance and trading of securities. Under state law, particularly 
Delaware law, it was generally accepted that the duty of disclosure was triggered 
only if shareholder approval was sought with respect to the transaction to which 
the disclosure was directed. That is, if the corporation sought shareholder 
approval for the issuance of securities or a merger transaction, it was required to 
disclose all information that a reasonable shareholder would deem necessary to 
form a judgment about the merits of the proposed transaction.131 
Yet notwithstanding a tendency to cabin the duty of disclosure,132 there 
exists significant ambiguity in the jurisprudence on this point. In the oft-cited 
Malone v. Brincat opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court observes: 
Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive false communications 
from directors even in the absence of a request for shareholder action. When the 
directors are not seeking shareholder action, but are deliberately misinforming 
shareholders about the business of the corporation, either directly or by a public 
statement, there is a violation of fiduciary duty. That violation may result in a 
derivative claim on behalf of the corporation or a cause of action for damages. 
There may also be a basis for equitable relief to remedy the violation.133 
And in a similar vein, the Delaware courts have sustained section 220 
requests134 in the face of preemption arguments.135 As Stevelman Kahn has 
noted, “[t]he Delaware Supreme Court’s reversal of the chancery court’s 
decision in Brincat validates the idea that shareholders’ informational needs, 
whether they relate to voting their shares or determining whether or not to 
continue to hold them, are core concerns of corporate fiduciary law and 
corporate governance.”136 
Again, a more muscular duty of disclosure could distinguish itself from 
federal disclosure obligations. There are already good ideas in this regard. First, 
 
problem of corporate (mis)disclosure has fallen outside the traditional boundary of state corporate law . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 131. Walsh, supra note 126, at 337 (emphasis added). 
 132. See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc’y of Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996) (“We see no legitimate 
basis to create a new cause of action which would replicate, by state decisional law, the provisions of . . . the 
1934 [Securities and Exchange] Act.”). 
 133. 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 134. See supra Subpart III.B.1. 
 135. See, e.g., Shamrock Assocs. v. Tex. Am. Energy Corp., 517 A.2d 658, 662 (Del. Ch. 1986). In 
considering the interrelationship between SEC Rules 14a-7 (the stockholder name “list or mail” rule), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-7 (2018), and section 220, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2019), the Delaware Chancery court has 
observed that “there is no express conflict which would mandate a finding of preemption and the Delaware 
statute presents no obstacle to the objectives of federal law. The mere fact that state law acts upon a product of 
federal law—the NOBO [Non-Objecting Beneficial Owners] list is insufficient to trigger preemption.” 
Shamrock Assocs., 517 A.2d at 662; see also Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855, 856 (Del. Ch. 1969) 
(“[A]s to the absence of approval by the SEC, this is irrelevant in a § 220 proceeding.”). 
 136. Stevelman Kahn, supra note 63, at 524. 
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while federal securities law is focused on capital markets, state corporate law is 
focused on the behavior of the board and management.137 Second, federal 
securities law is more focused on specific disclosure rules, whereas state 
corporate law is more focused on standards-based common law. 138 In the words 
of one commentator, “[b]eyond the disclosures specifically and systematically 
prescribed by these federal statutes [the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934] and regulations lies an abyss of potential liability in 
connection with corporate disclosures and nondisclosures.”139 
Confronting the question of federalism—more specifically how the state 
duty of disclosure might relate to the federal duty of disclosure—would force 
courts to confront how state law would differ. For instance, consider the 
“materiality” doctrine. As discussed in Part II above, the Delaware courts have 
essentially adopted the definition of “materiality” from federal common law.140 
As former Delaware Supreme Court Justice Jack Jacobs notes, “A classic, 
although perhaps not complete, definition of the fiduciary duty of disclosure 
under Delaware law is that corporate directors are required to disclose all 
material information within their control when they seek stockholder action.”141 
This may all be fine as far as it goes, but at least in the context of recent 
jurisprudence in the context of bank valuations in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), the Delaware courts seem to be gravitating toward a “fair summary” 
 
 137. See, e.g., id. at 513 (“Fiduciary law has a distinctive contribution to make in the regulation of managers’ 
participation in disclosure. In contrast to the securities laws’ preoccupation with the integrity of ‘the market,’ 
corporate fiduciary law has focused on supporting the integrity of corporate managers as it affects their official 
behavior.”). 
 138. See, e.g., id. at 514 (“This standards-based, more intuitive heuristic for managers’ participation in the 
disclosure process supplies an important counter balance and complement to federal law’s regulation of the 
precise timing and required topics of corporate disclosure.”); see also id. at 513 (“Corporate fiduciary law should 
operate, optimally, as a supplement to such alternative, rules-based systems in reinforcing ‘the big picture’ in 
regard to shareholders’ rightful expectations of candor, honesty, and diligence in managers’ administration over 
disclosure.”). 
 139. John H. Matheson, Corporate Disclosure Obligations and the Parameters of Rule 10b-5: Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson and Beyond, 14 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1988). A former Commissioner of the SEC has suggested that recent 
securities reform has gone too far: 
Some of these requirements [in Dodd-Frank] unashamedly interfere in corporate governance matters 
traditionally and appropriately left to the states. Others masquerade as disclosure, but are in reality 
attempts to affect substantive behavior through disclosure regulation. This mandated intrusion into 
corporate governance will impose substantial compliance costs on companies, along with a one-size-
fits-all approach that will likely result in a one-size-fits-none model instead. This stands in stark 
contrast with the flexibility traditionally achieved through private ordering under more open-ended 
state legal regimes. 
Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the 26th Annual Corporate Law Institute at the Tulane 
University Law School: Federal Preemption of State Corporate Governance (Mar. 27, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch032714dmg.html. 
 140. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. For cases espousing the materiality standard, see generally, 
Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1173 (Del. 2000); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 925 (Del. 
2000). 
 141. Jacobs, supra note 71, at 395. 
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standard that might be more stringent than materiality.142 Along these lines, 
might Delaware try someday to differentiate the scope of its disclosures from 
federal law? 
In a similar vein, consider that: 
An action for a breach of fiduciary duty arising out of disclosure violations 
in connection with a request for stockholder action does not include the elements 
of reliance, causation, and actual quantifiable monetary damages. Instead, such 
actions require the challenged disclosure to have a connection to the request for 
shareholder action. The essential inquiry in such an action is whether the alleged 
omission or misrepresentation is material.143 
By contrast, when the duty of disclosure applies in contexts not requiring 
shareholder action, reliance becomes a key element of the cause of action.144 
Should Delaware’s jurisprudence adopt the “fraud-on-the market” presumption 
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of securities fraud 
actions?145 Should it espouse doctrines less protective of plaintiffs? More 
protective? 
A reinvigorated duty of disclosure might throw into question the scope of 
the so-called Delaware “carve-out” under the 1998 Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). The “carve-out” preserves state law class 
actions when there is a request for shareholder action regarding an issuer buying 
back its shares, a tender offer, or a merger.146 Yet to the extent Brincat is taken 
 
 142. As then Vice Chancellor, now Chief Justice, Strine articulates it: 
  In my view, it is time that this ambivalence be resolved in favor of a firm statement that 
stockholders are entitled to a fair summary of the substantive work performed by the investment 
bankers upon whose advice the recommendations of their board as to how to vote on a merger or 
tender rely. I agree that our law should not encourage needless prolixity, but that concern cannot 
reasonably apply to investment bankers’ analyses, which usually address the most important issue to 
stockholders—the sufficiency of the consideration being offered to them for their shares in a merger 
or tender offer. Moreover, courts must be candid in acknowledging that the disclosure of the banker’s 
“fairness opinion” alone and without more, provides stockholders with nothing other than a 
conclusion, qualified by a gauze of protective language designed to insulate the banker from liability. 
In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 449 (Del. Ch. 2002) (emphasis added). See generally 
Brittany M. Giusini, Note, Pure Resources’ “Fair Summary” Standard: Disclosures Away from Obtaining 
Clarity in the M&A Context, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 595 (2013) (offering a three-tiered approach to solve the 
problems resulting from Pure Resources: (1) disclosure of substantive work performed by investment bankers 
should be judged by the “materiality” standard set out in Skeen; (2) once a disclosure claim is initiated, boards 
should present courts with sufficient facts to show why the information sought by shareholders was not material; 
and (3) if the board acts in bad faith and fails to disclose, heightened equitable damages attach). 
 143. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) (footnote omitted). 
 144. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 126, at 338 (“One of the difficulties encountered by shareholders who 
bring duty to disclose claims based on the mere sale or retention of shares, when shareholder action is not 
implicated, is the need to prove reliance. And if reliance is proved it must be done on an individual basis, making 
the assertion of class claims difficult, and without class actions such litigation is not practical.”). 
 145. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988). 
 146. More specifically, the statute preserves class action litigation under state law when there is a request 
with regard to 
(i) the purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer exclusively from or to 
holders of equity securities of the issuer; or 
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seriously,147 the “carve-out” may be unduly narrow. As Professor Jennifer 
O’Hare observes: 
The same facts that give rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty of 
disclosure often also give rise to a claim under the anti-fraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws. For example, assume that a company is making a self-
tender for its outstanding common stock. After the tender offer has been 
completed, it is discovered that the company’s tender offer materials contained 
material misstatements or omissions. Because the company’s communications 
were materially false, a shareholder could bring an action for breach of fiduciary 
duty of disclosure. In addition, because the misleading tender offer materials 
constituted a material misrepresentation in connection with the purchase and sale 
of a security, the shareholder could also potentially bring an action under Rule 
10b-5 of the federal securities laws.148 
As such: 
Following Brincat, the Delaware carve-out no longer reflects Delaware’s law of 
fiduciary duty of disclosure. Because the Delaware carve-out only applies to 
actions for breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure when shareholder action has 
been requested, the Uniform Act does not preserve state actions involving 
misleading market communications. In other words, certain state law actions 
based on breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure are preempted by the Uniform 
Act.149 
The “carve-out” was presumably designed for a pre-Brincat world and 
does not necessarily reflect recent jurisprudence.150 To the extent that the state 
duty of disclosure is an after-thought, this state of affairs doesn’t matter. Yet to 
the extent it is invigorated, then it could give Delaware space to push for an 
expansion of its “carve-out.” 
 
(ii) any recommendation, position, or other communication with respect to the sales of securities of 
an issuer that— 
(I) is made by or on behalf of the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer to holders of equity securities 
of the issuer; and 
(II) concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to voting their securities, acting in 
response to a tender or exchange offer, or exercising dissenters’ or appraisal rights. 
15 U.S.C § 77p(d) (2012). 
 147. See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text. 
 148. Jennifer O’Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty 
of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 475, 494 (2002). 
 149. Id. at 508. O’Hare suggests that “Congress should amend the Delaware carve-out to preserve all actions 
based on the fiduciary duty of disclosure, whether shareholder action has been requested or not.” Id. at 526. 
 150. As SEC Chairman Levitt testified with regard to a House bill that did not include the “carve-out”: 
H.R. 1689, as currently drafted, could preempt important state corporate law claims, most notably 
claims made pursuant to the “fiduciary duty of disclosure.” The fiduciary duty of disclosure imposes 
on directors and others the duty to speak truthfully when addressing shareholders with respect to 
certain corporate matters. . . . In addition, when the stockholder action involves the purchase or sale 
of a security (e.g., corporate programs to repurchase their own shares and tender offers), the bill likely 
would have the effect of eliminating state causes of action arising out of such transactions. 
Concerning H.R. 1689, The “Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997,” Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Fin. & Hazardous Materials, 105th Cong. 9 (1998) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (emphasis 
added). 
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CONCLUSION 
While disclosure is far from a panacea,151 continued refusal to engage in 
an invigorated duty of disclosure will regrettably take corporate law down the 
path of decreased shareholder protections and toward a specialized form of 
contract law. The duties of care and loyalty are well-worn and there is little that 
will likely happen, save for the duty of loyalty’s inexorable march toward BJR 
as a standard of review in the wake of cases such as In re CNX Gas Corp. 
Shareholders Litigation,152 Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.,153 Lyondell 
Chemical Co. v. Ryan,154 and C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami 
General Employees’.155 The duty of good faith, post-Disney, is too fragile to be 
of much use. As Justice Walsh has candidly noted, “[a]s our current experience 
indicates, our theory of fiduciary responsibility has not been adequate to prevent 
abuse.”156 A counterpoint to all of this could be a reinvigorated duty of 
disclosure. But our current conceptualization of the duty of disclosure is too 
scattershot.157 We need to rethink it—and, in the process, recognize that the duty 
of disclosure may actually explain a lot of what is actually going on in corporate 
law today. So while many jurists might consider the duty of disclosure as dead, 
in many ways it should be as relevant as ever. 
 
 151. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE 
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 191 (2014) (“But disclosure cannot be the key to such new 
designs. . . . ‘While disclosure alone is unlikely to help, there’s another option’—defaults.” (quoting Michael S. 
Barr et al., Opinion, A One-Size-Fits-All Solution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/26/opinion/26barr.html)). 
 152. C.A. No. 5377-VCL, 2010 WL 2291842 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010). 
 153. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014), overruled by Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 193 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018). 
 154. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
 155. 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014). 
 156. Walsh, supra note 126, at 340. 
 157. Cf. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha’s (and Steve’s) Good Faith: An Officer’s Duty of Loyalty at the 
Intersection of Good Faith and Candor 7 (Univ. of Tenn. Knoxville Coll. of L., Research Paper No. 71, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440919 (noting our “inherently reactive” disclosure doctrines). 
